We describe a n a r chitecture for secure, independent, interworking services Oasis. Each service i s made responsible for the classi cation of its clients into named roles, using a formal logic to specify precise conditions for entering each role. A client becomes authenticated by presenting credentials to a service that enable the service to prove that the client conforms to its policy for entry to a particular role. During authentication a data structure i s created that embodies the proof.
Abstract
We describe a n a r chitecture for secure, independent, interworking services Oasis. Each service i s made responsible for the classi cation of its clients into named roles, using a formal logic to specify precise conditions for entering each role. A client becomes authenticated by presenting credentials to a service that enable the service to prove that the client conforms to its policy for entry to a particular role. During authentication a data structure i s created that embodies the proof.
An authenticated client is issued a r ole membership certi cate RMC for its subsequent use with that service. An RMC is an encryption-protected capability which includes the role name, the identity of the principal to which it was issued and a reference to the issuing service. A p r oof rule of one service may refer to an authenticated user of another; that is, an RMC issued by one service may be r equired a s a c r edential during authentication by another. A dynamic proof tree may thus be built which exhibits amongst other things the trust relationships between the services which the client has entered.
The rst part of the paper shows how a service may de ne a set of proof rules Horn clauses that specify who may use it and in what way. Delegation of rights may be expressed naturally within these rules.
The second part of the paper presents the design details of the system. Associated with each RMC issued by a service, the service keeps a credential record CR. The CR indicates the predicates against which the RMC was issued and lists all other services which have issued RMCs to this principal based on this CR. If one of these predicates becomes false, the local RMC is immediately invalidated. Event technology is used to achieve rapid revocation of the dependent RMCs issued by other services; any portion of a proof tree which is based on this predicate collapses.
The system is inherently decentralised and has a tuneable reaction to network or server failure which allows services to make appropriate decisions when authorization or revocation information is unavailable.
A prototype system has been implemented and tested.
Introduction
The access matrix Access control is often presented as the enforcement of policy described by a n access matrix. The columns of the matrix represent the operations that may be performed on the protected object or service, and each row represents a client. For each client there is therefore a complete description of which operations that client may undertake, and likewise, for each operation we may enumerate all clients who have access. The access matrix is conceptually simple and the majority of access control models are based on it.
In order for the access matrix to represent a particular policy, we must enumerate who the potential clients are. In an open environment a n y process may attempt to perform any exported method on any object.
Our approach
We argue that it is insu cient simply to enumerate all possible clients of a given service, but that those clients should be classi ed by that service according to service speci c semantics.
For example a login service may use categories logged-in user, logged-in professor, loggedin student to distinguish between classes of client. Within these categories it may distinguish individuals by using identi ers, for example UserJean or StudentFred; Math. Equally, a conference service may use the categories Chair and Member, and a bank account service may use the categories customer and credit card authority. If services are responsible for this naming of the roles in which their clients may operate, then revocation and delegation can be formulated in terms of the granting and revoking of these names. This allows the authors of services to express application speci c semantics clearly.
We note that the way in which clients are classied for use in the access control statements of one service will not be suitable for use in all services. It is therefore essential to allow each service to perform naming and authentication of its clients in order to authorize them as its named users. It should be possible to capture the trust relationships between services. For example a conference service should be able to express if the login service guarantees you are logged in as user jb or user km then you may become a named user Chair of this conference service". That is, a principal may b e issued with a name by one service on condition that it has already been issued with some speci ed name of another service. A proof tree may therefore be built corresponding to the trust relationships between the services which it spans. Our implementation mechanisms maintain such proof trees dynamically. A principal which has satis ed the conditions for possession of a name is issued with a Role Membership Certi cate RMC, and the issuing service maintains an associated credential record CR dependent on those conditions. With this new approach to access control, issues such as delegation and revocation have clear semantics. For example the policy of the conference service may be that only someone who has the name Chair having therefore satis ed the authentication check has the right to speak but may delegate this right to someone with the name member. Policy may therefore be expressed to a higher degree of precision than is possible in pure access matrix based systems.
If a condition for holding a role name becomes false any service that depends on this condition, directly or indirectly, should be informed immediately. We use event technology to signal such a predicate violation, thus collapsing any portion of the proof tree which is no longer valid. This mechanism is used to implement rapid and selective revocation of privileges at all the a ected services in the distributed system. Distributed systems are subject to independent failure of component sites. We provide a heartbeat protocol, which may be tuned to arbitrary time granularity. We can thus distinguish between the absence of a predicate violation event and failure of the sending site. A highly sensitive service may suspend the activity of a name that depends on the continuing validity of a credential held by a failed system, whereas other services may c hoose to allow potentially a ected names to continue to operate. Again, we provide a general, tuneable mechanism on which a v ariety of policies can be based.
The approach is naturally distributed, with each object or service responsible for its own authentication and authorization. This allows decentralised administration, a major goal of open systems research. A simple role de nition language RDL is provided which allows each service to express the policies that govern the conditions for its use.
Section 2 describes related work. We believe that no other system has achieved the ne-grained control, generality and openness of our approach. Part 1 of the paper, sections 3 through 7, is about specifying access control policy. Section 3 discusses the nature of the clients of a service. Section 4 shows how services may de ne role names independently. Section 5 de nes a logic and its associated language in which access control policy may be expressed; a role de nition language RDL. Section 6 shows how access rights may be withdrawn by selective revocation. Section 7 presents access control for a ling system as a short case study. Part 2 of the paper discusses the implementation of this design. Section 8 describes the structure of a role membership certi cate. Section 9 shows how event driven software technology can be exploited to achieve immediate and selective revocation of rights. Section 10 describes credential records, which form the heart of the implementation strategy. Section 11 discusses issues speci c to the distribution of the mechanisms. Section 12 discusses how failures are handled within the model. Each service may decide its own policy when a source of credentials used during authentication has failed. Section 13 summarises and concludes the paper.
Related Work
The seminal work by Lampson 1 established the ground rules for access control policy speci cation and implementation mechanism. The formulation of access control in terms of client naming has its roots in existing role based access control architectures, such as are described in 2 . However these models use the term role as a pseudonym for user, which is less general than the approach presented here. Other attempts at the formal speci cation of access control policy are Taos 3 and 4 . We believe that RDL statements are more natural and more comprehensible than these approaches.
Existing models tend to rely on a single, per organisation policy to de ne who undertakes each role, and what the relationships between roles are 5 . We see roles as more widely applicable and more exible, capable of being de ned independently by services inhabiting multiple administrative domains in an open world. For this style of use we need a model that supports application speci c roles, and that captures the relationship between the roles dened by and used within di erent contexts. In an open environment it is important that policy statements capture the dynamic nature of access control. If this is not the case, and policies must be manually updated to re ect changes in access rights, then it is di cult to reason about how access right might propagate through a system, or to prevent error.
Requirements for security in open systems are set out in 6 . The paper describes a scalable and open mechanism for enforcing security, but issues of policy expression are not discussed. The mechanism is based on capabilities and has the traditional features of exible delegation, but poor revocation. The Oasis design includes a logic for policy expression and the implementation provides e cient and selective revocation.
Part 1: Speci cation of access control policy 3 What makes a client?
The terms user and client are often used synonymously. However, requests to a service do not come directly from users -they come from processes. Although it is often a simpli cation to assume that the request was initiated by a user, this is not always helpful -especially if the process making the request is executing a malicious program masquerading as a benign one.
There are several classes of attribute a process might possess that are generally useful for classifying it as a client of a particular service. Firstly, the process may h a ve already been classi ed by the same, or some other, service. For example, if a client has been classi ed by a login service as representing a particular user, then that information is likely to be of use to other services.
The second attribute is evidence of delegation. For example a process representing a user might allow a process running a Java applet to read a le that it would not otherwise have access to. Whether this delegation is honoured will depend on the protection policy governing access to the ling system. In terms of Oasis, rights themselves are not delegated. Delegation is used to supply potential clients with additional attributes that allow them to be accepted as clients by a particular service. As will be seen, delegation of rights is simply a special case of this.
Finally the process may h a ve delegated rights revoked. For example, we m a y revoke the rights given to the Java applet once we believe that it has fullled the intended task. In addition to these attributes, there are many others that may be applicable to particular services: a le service may give special privileges to the owner of a le; a bank service may need to be invoked by running a trusted program; a news feed may allow access by students only at weekends. A exible access control model must be able to deal with each of these circumstances without in icting an unnecessary cost on all services.
If the clients of a service are carefully classi ed, the access matrix itself is often extremely simple. Only interactions between clients and objects need be considered. Interactions between clients such a s delegation and revocation are subsumed by client naming.
Allocating Names
Policy speci cation in Oasis is based on sets of rules which indicate the conditions under which a client may obtain a name or role. As a client runs, it will gather credentials issued by di erent services. It may for example obtain a certi cate to show that it has successfully supplied a password, or a certicate that it is executing a particular program text. The client m a y then approach an Oasis service and ask to be granted membership of a role. The service will consult its policy and, if appropriate, will grant the client a role membership certi cate RMC indicating that it is now a memb e r o f t h e requested role. This RMC may then be used directly by the client when performing operations, or alternatively it may b e presented to the same or another Oasis server to be used as a credential when entering a new role.
In existing access control architectures, the issuing and revoking of rights or names is considered as a core facility. The services responsible for such actions are generally highly secure and run with special privilege. Oasis is an open, distributed architecture, and the designers were unwilling to make such assumptions. For this reason, Oasis servers are designed to be essentially independent, and there need be no global consensus about the trustworthiness of clients, or certi cates issued by other services. On the other hand, a particular Oasis service may place limited trust in other services. For example, a service allocating organisational roles, such a s Manager and Service Engineer, is likely to rely on certi cates issued by a Login service. This provides a useful level of abstraction. The organisational role service is interested in the validity of a Login certicate, and relies on the correct issue and revocation of such RMCs; it is not concerned with the details of how o r w h y such certi cates are issued. This decouples the speci cation and administration of the conditions for Login, from the speci cation and administration of the conditions for organisational role membership.
In general, there may be many services issuing Oasis certi cates for di erent, unrelated, purposes. For example, each instance of a conference application may issue certi cates indicating who may act as the Chair of the meeting, and who the members are. It is an important feature of the Oasis architecture that there need be no trust between di erent instances of this application, and that the conference service need not be trusted by other unrelated services and applications.
Policy Expression in Oasis
Each Oasis service is at liberty to use its own means of policy expression and method for realising that policy; to conform to Oasis a service need only issue certi cates and maintain their validity. However, there are many reasons why it is advantageous to use a common means to express policy. First, it is important that policies may be easily understood by administrators and users; if this is not the case, then errors are inevitable. Second, it aids reasoning about the interaction of policies between di erent services; this reasoning may be performed by hand, or with the aid of automated tools such as theorem provers.
For these reasons a role de nition language RDL was developed that allows the exible and unambiguous speci cation of access control policy. An RDL statement m a y be considered as an axiom in a proof system, aiding both human and automated reasoning.
Each RDL statement de nes a set of conditions which su ce for a client to enter a role. In addition, by annotating the clauses of the statement, the circumstances in which this role should be revoked may also be speci ed. The grammar for RDL is given in gure 1, and there is an example below. The conditions for entry to a role are described in terms of the credentials that establish a client's suitability, together with constraints on the parameters of those credentials.
For example, an examination service may wish to indicate that a client may enter the role ChiefExaminer if they provide credentials proving that they are logged in as user km Note the use of the constraint P on the delegation in the above axiom. This is used to allow the delegator to specify a constraint on the client using the certi cate, for example the Chief Examiner would typically constrain the delegation to apply to a particular user by insisting that that client supplied an additional Login certi cate. This is more robust than relying on the delegation certi cate being passed to the correct client, and in addition allows a delegation certi cate to be used by a n umber of processes that represent the same client. This is particularly useful if a delegation certi cate is to be used over a long period of time, for example if a Lecturer delegates to a colleague whilst on sabbatical leave.
Revocation
The discussion of RDL so far has concentrated on specifying conditions for entering a role. It is just
-enter the role. Revocation should therefore take place only when the client is no longer eligible to enter the role. It could be argued that these are precisely the conditions for revocation, but we believe that a more exible approach is better.
In In the following section we consider how RDL may be used to specify a more traditional form of delegation, and in the second part of the paper we show how such a statement is translated to a direct and e cient implementation.
7 Case Study: Policy expression for a Filing System
The previous section explained how RDL may be used to specify how clients may obtain roles. In this section we show that certi cates subsume traditional ling system capabilities, so that RDL may be used for the speci cation and implementation of policy within a ling system. A ling system is unusual in that it maintains a large number of policies, typically one set of policies per le. In a traditional system, such policy statements take the form of mappings between users and rights, and are called access control lists. The rest of the policy, relating to the delegation and revocation of rights, is usually implicit in the implementation and is not spelt out in policy statements. This is clearly a disadvantage when reasoning about policy interactions.
Under Oasis, each A CL may be replaced with a set of RDL statements which indicate the classes of client to be granted access, and map these to a role representing the capability to access a le. As we t ypically require many levels of access, this role may be parameterised with a set variable indicating the operations that are permitted. For example the role UseFilefread; write; delegate; :::g might be appropriate. In order to use a le, a client rst requests a UseFile role membership certi cate, supplying as argument their Login certicate or other credentials, and in return is granted a certi cate to be used as a capability when performing operations on that le. A RMC certi cate may only be used by the process to which it is issued, so there is no need to parameterise the UseFile certi cate to indicate the user for whom it is intended. Equally, RMCs are speci c to a service context. In this example, the service context is the le to which the RMC pertains. This scheme is more exible than a traditional ACL as roles may be issued against credentials other than user identity or group membership. For example the rule UseFilefreadg Meeting.memberx attached to a le would allow members of the meeting in the earlier example to enter a role issued by the mutually untrusting le service in order to read the meeting's minutes. Although more exible, RDL statements are also more complex than traditional ACL statements, and in practice a shorthand may b e p r o vided that is automatically expanded to RDL when required.
As le access policy is now described in terms of RDL, we can specify a policy on the delegation and revocation of access rights. As an example, imagine that we wish to allow recursive delegation between logged in users, but that we wish to restrict delegation to other clients to be read only. We m a y then use the rules
UseFilex
Login.LoggedOnu UseFiley : x y UseFilefreadg UseFiley : delegate 2 y A more detailed discussion of this case study may be found in 7, Chapter 5 .
Part 2: System design and implementation
In the previous sections we h a ve considered the exible speci cation of access control policy in terms of client naming. In the rest of the paper we consider how such a s c heme may be implemented.
Format of a Role Membership Certi cate
Each RMC consists of a role name, a set of parameters to that role, a 64 bit record used for revocation purposes called a credential record r eference CRR, and an optional signature to secure it cryptographically. 
CRR
Each RMC may be used by only one process, and protection against stolen certi cates is provided by including the process identity when calculating the signature, as in 8 . The CRR is associated with a credential record CR held by the issuing service see below; each RMC and each delegation certicate have a single associated CR.
The format of the certi cates is quite general since they are designed for use by many interworking services that require di erent n umbers and types of parameter. In particular, each service is at liberty to use a di erent mechanism for signing their certi cates. This allows the designers of each service to make appropriate tradeo s in terms of signature length, computational cost and security.
A client must present an appropriate RMC, issued by that service, with each request to use a service. The service must validate the signature, to ensure that the certi cate has not been tampered with, and to check the client process's identity. It will then use the CRR to locate the CR associated with the RMC. The CR indicates whether the certi cate has been revoked. The issuing service will then inform the client application of its decision. As we have seen in Part 1, a service may need to verify a number of RMCs issued by this and other services before issuing an RMC to a client. Each RMC presented must be validated by the service which issued it.
As the integrity c heck against modi cation and the check for revocation use di erent techniques, the result of the cryptographic check m a y be cached by the service to avoid recomputation if the same RMC is used repeatedly. Revocation must be checked via the CR on every use. An e cient mechanism for maintaining revocation state in the CRs is described in the next section.
Event Driven Evaluation
In Part 1 we described how a client m a y collect certi cates indicating that it is a memb e r o f a n umber of roles, and how these certi cates may be presented to a service in order for the client t o e n ter further roles. This process was likened to establishing a dynamic proof of role membership as illustrated in gure 2. If certi cates were never revoked, implementation would be straightforward; each service would validate the RMCs presented and issue further certi cates if appropriate. One approach to revocation management, used in Taos, is to discard certi cates periodically, t h us forcing clients to acquire new certi cates and re-enter roles. This can lead to a costly implementation, especially if there are long chains of membership. In addition, the lifetime of a certi cate is critical, as revocation cannot take e ect until that lifetime expires. The fact that revocation is not immediate is a security loophole.
Oasis takes a di erent approach. The proofs established by application of RDL rules are assumed to hold inde nitely until some event occurs that Figure 2 : Entering a Role leads directly to a change. Data structures representing the proofs are established in such a w ay that when an event occurs, precisely the dependent portion of the proof tree will collapse, without a ecting the validity of other RMCs.
To a c hieve this we use a single CR to represent a server's current knowledge about each individual fact. A CR is a small record stored with the issuing Oasis service to record that a fact is true, false or is currently unknown by that service. Events are precisely those occurrences that lead to a change in the state of some CR. We arrange that each revokable delegation, group membership or other credential that may change is represented by a CR. When a credential changes, its CR is modi ed and this information is propagated, so that all dependent CRs issued by the service are also modi ed. Each certi cate is dependent on the state of exactly one CR, which allows the service to validate certicates rapidly. If some event occurs requiring that the certi cate should be revoked, then the CR will be set to false, and validation of the certi cate will fail.
In a distributed environment, certi cates issued by one service frequently depend on the validity o f certi cates issued by another. During authentication, the service carrying out the checks will ask the service issuing any imported certi cate to verify the certi cate, and to notify it if the state changes subsequently. This can considerably reduce the amount of network tra c, and also the access latency of authorization checks. This is considered in detail in the following sections.
Credential Records
The CRR is a reference to a unique CR within the issuing service. When an RDL statement i s i n voked in order to enter a role, then a graph of CRs can be constructed to represent the membership rules involved. For example, in gure 3 there are three revokable credentials; the login certi cate, a current group membership and an indication of the Examiner's willingness to delegate. The certi cates involved all contain references to the related CRs, and the dependencies can easily be included in the proof graph.
Format of a Credential Record
The format of a credential record is shown in gure 4. CRs are stored in a large table within a server. Whenever a table entry is reused, the A client e n tering the role Candidate must supply a Login Certi cate and a Delegation Certi cate. From the references embedded in these two certi cates, and the one found by group membership lookup, the illustrated graph can be constructed. The shaded record represents the logical conjunction of the membership rules; a reference to this credential record is included in the membership certi cate. The arcs represent the membership rules which m ust remain true. Magic eld is incremented, thus ensuring that table index; Magic forms an identi er which is unique over the life of the service. This tuple is used to form a 64 bit identi er which becomes the CRR. This method can also be used for CRs stored in persistent store, and is described in more detail in 9, 6.4 . Each CR stores a list of its children, so that when its state changes the information can be propagated to its dependents. Their values will be changed by this means and the process will recurse, if necessary. Rather than storing backwards pointers from child records to parents, a more e cient s c heme is used, and counters are kept of the number of parents that are true, false or unknown due to network failures. This information is all that is required to set the state of a record.
A permanent ag within each record indicates if state changes are possible. Whenever a state change is not possible, for example after revocation, the record itself is redundant and can be garbage collected. A record may also be deleted if it represents a fact that is uninteresting, i.e. one that has not been used for issuing certi cates directly, and that no longer has any c hild records.
Garbage collection takes place by unlinking parent ! child links whenever the value of a parent is made permanent. The record cannot be deleted immediately because this might leave dangling references from its parents. A periodic sweep algorithm unlinks these references, and deletes uninteresting and permanent records.
Issuing Delegation Certi cates
When a client wishes to delegate membership of a role to another client, it applies to the issuing service for a delegation certi cate, and a CR is established to record the validity of the delegation. If delegation is to be a membership rule then as a side e ect a revocation certi cate is returned to the delegator; this contains a reference to the CR for the delegation certi cate. The delegation certi cate is then passed to the second client, who accepts delegation by using the certi cate as a credential when entering the named role. Both parties must agree to the delegation, and the delegator can be assured of the ability to revoke, regardless of network failures.
Since clients are named by process identi ers, the candidate client cannot be named directly, but must be identi ed by specifying constraints on one or more roles that they possess. In our example the Chief Examiner may choose to del- Login.LoggedOnx,y where x is in Staff. An additional advantage in specifying delegates by the roles that they hold is that delegation may persist for longer than the lifetime of a low-level identi er. It may be appropriate to use one digital signature function for short-lived certi cates such as RMCs, and another more secure function for delegation certi cates, which are prone to di erent forms of cryptographic attack. Although long term delegation is useful, it is not always appropriate: for example, a print service should only retain access to a le for as long as it takes to print it. A delegator may specify a time limit on the life of the delegation, after which automatic revocation will occur. Revocation may also be speci ed to take place when the delegator exits the delegating role. When revocation occurs the delegation CR is invalidated, as is the CR relating to any issued certi cate. These invalidations are permanent, and the CRs may therefore be deleted as described above. Table   Client Client's CRR Heartbeat Info. Table   B In a distributed environment, certi cates issued at one server may be used as credentials at another. Consequently, a CR in one server may be the parent of a record in another. This raises issues of naming, independent failure modes and robustness. In order to decouple the name space and failure modes of two services, external credential records are used to represent remote facts and event noti cation is used to communicate state changes between servers.
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External Credential Records
If a server requires a reference to a CR on another service, it creates a local surrogate record called an external credential record ECR. This record contains information about the identity, location and state of the record being represented, together with the standard attributes of a CR, including an identi er within the local name space. The state of the record is maintained by event noti cation, as described below, and in all other respects the record is treated as a local CR. When the local garbage collector decides that the record is no longer required, the external server is informed so that it can delete corresponding state, including the requirement to notify changes.
Event Noti cation
Asynchronous event noti cation is an important feature of distributed systems, and the RPC mechanism used in the current implementation of Oasis has been extended to add event management functions 10 . Oasis makes use of these functions by de ning the event type Modi edCRR; newstate in the interface de nition le of an Oasis server. A server may then register interest in the state of a particular CR, and will be informed if its state changes by being sent an event with CRR and newstate set to appropriate values. In this way revocation taking place in one server may a ect certi cates issued by another. The e ect of ECRs and event noti cation is illustrated by gure 5.
12 The E ect of Failures Event noti cation between servers may be delayed inde nitely by network congestion or failure. Additionally, either of the parties may fail and restart independently. These situations must be taken into account in the design of any distributed system involving events. The approaches described here are implemented as part of a generic event library, and are equally suitable for any e v ent based application 7 .
Consider two parties A and B, where A wishes to send B a stream of messages. We assume that the message transport system delivers messages in order, point to point. If every message A sends contains a sequence number, then B will be able to detect if any previous message has been lost. If, in addition, A ensures that a message is sent at least once every t seconds, then B will know within time t whether a message has been lost or delayed. This is the basic requirement for event handshaking. In addition, B must periodically inform A that events have been received, so that A may delete any associated state.
This protocol is called a heartbeat protocol, and a form of it is used in the event system implemented. The server responsible for signalling events is used as the initiator of the protocol and ensures that a heartbeat event is sent every t seconds. Individual events and heartbeats are not acknowledged for reasons of e ciency, but every i heartbeats the client replies, so that the server can detect failures and resend event instances if required.
This leads to a system with the following characteristics:
A client can be certain of receiving an event within time t of its generation, or of detecting that noti cation may have failed or been delayed. A server can detect that a client is not responding, and after a period, can assume that it is no longer running.
A client who processes and forwards events can treat heartbeats in a similar manner. This feature allows a service to provide guarantees about`indirect' events from other services. In Oasis, a missed heartbeat leads to ECRs being marked as unknown. This state propagates to child records, and possibly to other servers. When connection is re-established the state of each record is read and the current state is propagated to its children. This reduces the e ect of minor network errors. The period of the heartbeat and the frequency of response can be set on a per-service basis, allowing each service to choose its own trade-o between failure tolerance and security.
Summary and Conclusions
We h a ve described an approach to access control in which each component of an open system a service, say may name its clients according to its internal semantics. The service expresses its policy for the conditions under which a client m a y acquire a name in a role de nition language RDL. The conditions form a set of Horn clauses proof rules. A rule of one service may require possession of a name within some other service as a condition. Possession of a name within a service may therefore depend on the existence of a dynamic proof tree spanning several other services.
Such a proof system is ideal for the precise expression of policy. Its implementation is e cient in that acquiring a name within a service can exploit an existing proof tree rather than building a new one; that is, recursive c hecking of every prior condition in the tree is not needed. The dynamic proof tree should collapse if any of its supporting predicates becomes false. We a c hieve this by using event driven software technology to signal a false predicate event immediately it occurs, in order to revoke the credentials that depend on it. Selective and e cient revocation is thus facilitated.
Delegation policy is speci ed in terms of names. An appropriate credential certi cate is created for the delegate. Its invalidation can be caused by the signalling of an event, which might be a timer expiry or completion of the task for which delegation was used, as well as through revocation by the delegator.
The scheme extends naturally to support evolution of the entry rules. The proof tree supporting an RMC may be made to depend on the entry rule used during authentication. If that rule is changed, this may be signalled as an event and the RMC revoked. The client m ust then request a replacement RMC according to the new policy.
The system is inherently distributed and a proof tree may span several systems. If a component fails then superior components that rely on its guarantee of the truth of a predicate must have a policy for dealing with the situation. We h a ve provided a failure detection mechanism based on a heartbeat which may be tuned to arbitrary granularity. A highly sensitive service may suspend the activity o f a name that depends on a credential held by a failed system; other services may be more trusting and allow a ected names to continue to operate. Both the heartbeat period and the failure policy are service dependent.
The system is inherently decentralised and can support complex trust relationships between services. This is ideal for open distributed environments; no centralised access control scheme is imposed. We have provided a general and exible mechanism with which complex and subtle policies may be built. Existing mechanisms may be made to interoperate with Oasis.
